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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal
corporation of the State of U ta.h,
Pla.intiff and Appellant,
Case
No. 9347

-vs.STATE TAX COMMISSION
OF UTAH,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RES·P·O·NDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent sets forth the following statement
of facts, in addition to those in the brief for appellant.
In 1957 the Utah Legislature passed House Bill Number
30 on 13 March 1957, to take effect on 14 May 1957. It
was passed as Chapter 124, Laws of Utah 1957, and
amended portions of Title 59, Utah Code Annotated,
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1953. Section 59-14-71 thereof provided for the withholding of wages of non-resident employees..
In the 1959 session of the Utah Legislature two bills
were submitted affecting Section 59-14-71, U.C.A. 1953,
as amended. House Bill Number 93 was introduced and
took effect on 12 May 1959 as Chapter 111, Laws of
Utah 1959. Senate Bill Number 58 took effect on 12 May
1959 as Chapter 112, Laws of Utah 1959. Thus both bills
became effective the same day.
Senate Bill 58 passed the Senate on 26 January
1959 and passed the second House on 18 February 1959.
It was signed by the Governor on 4 March 1959. House
Bill 93 passed the House of Representatives on 23 February 1959, or just a few days subsequent to the dual
house passage of Senate Bill 58, and before the latter
bill had been signed by the Governor. Thereafter, House
Bill 93 was passed by the other House on 11 March 1959
and signed by the Governor on 18 March 1959. Both acts
came into effect on 12 May 1959, the same day. The
titles of both acts cover various aspects of Title 59,
U.C.A. 1953.
The obvious purpose of. both enactments was to provide that all employees within the state, and some resident
employees without, be covered by wage withholding provisions as to income tax due the State of Utah.
The enactments, Chapter 111 and Chapter 112, Laws
of Utah 1959, were not inconsistent with each other and,
as a consequence, based upon an opinion of the Attorney
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General, 59-029, they were consolidated in Section 59-1471, U.C.A. 1953, as amended.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED UPON EMPLOYERS
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER 111 OF THE
LAWS OF UTAH 1959, REQUIRING THE COLLECTION
AND REMISSION OF STATE INCOME TAXES TO THE
STATE OF UTAH WITHOUT COMPENSATION IS NOT
VIOLATIVE OF EITHER THE STATE OR FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONS.

POINT II.
CHAPTER 111 OF THE LAWS OF UTAH 1959 DOES
NOT VIOLATE SECTION 22, ARTICLE VI, OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH.

POINT III.
CHAPTER 111 OF THE LAWS OF UTAH 1959 IS NOT
INVALID FOR ANY IMPERFECTIONS APPEARING
IN THE TITLE THEREOF.

POINT IV.
CHAPTER 111 OF THE LAWS OF UTAH 1959 IS A
CONSTITUTIONAL ENACTMENT BINDING UPON
THE APPELLANT, AND ALL OTHERS WHOM IT
PURPORTS TO AFFECT.
3
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED UPON EMPLOYERS
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER 111 OF THE
LAWS OF UTAH 1959, REQUIRING THE COLLECTION
AND REMISSION OF STATE INCOME TAXES TO THE
STATE OF UTAH WITHOUT COMPENSATION IS NOT
VIOLATIVE OF EITHER THE STATE OR FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONS.
Appellant contends that since Chapter 111, Laws of
Utah 1959 makes no provision to reimburse employers
for the collection and withholding of taxes under the act
that it violates due process of law and constitutes the
imposition of an involuntary servitude. Appellant recognizes that the United States Supreme Court has held in
Brushaker v. Union. Pacific Railroad Compooy, 240 U.S.
1, 60 L. Ed. 493 (1915) that the appellant's arguments
is without merit. Indeed, the court did, for it said:
''So far as the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment is relied upon, it suffices to say that
there is no basis for such reliance since it is
equally well settled that such clause is not a limitation upon the taxing power conferred upon
Congress by the Constitution; in other words
that the Constitution does not conflict with itself
by conferring upon the one hand a taxing power
and taking the same power away on the other by
the limitation of the due process clause."
Hence, the Court held that there was no violation
of due process since the requirement that one collect the
tax at its source was merely incidental to the taxing
4
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power. The Court therefore reasoned the collection of
corporate income taxes was not in violation of the Constitution.
The United States Supreme Court has not remained
silent since the above case. In the case of Pierce Oil
Corporation v. Hopkins, 264 U. S. 137 (1924), the Supreme Court had before it a law of the State of Arkansas
requiring the seller of gasoline to collect a sales tax
from the purchaser, and remit the same to state without
reimbursement. There Mr. Justice Brandies, speaking
for a majority of the Court, stated:
"The claim that the act violates the due
process clause rests upon the argument that the
tax levies is a privilege tax for the use of the
highways by the purchasers ; that the seller is
required to pay the tax laid on the purchasers * * *
the seller is not afforded the means of reimbursing himself; and that, moreover, the mere process
of collecting the tax from the purchaser, and
making monthly reports and payments, subjects
the seller to an appreciable expense. A short
answer to this argument is that the seller is
directed to collect the tax from the purchaser
when he makes the sale; and that a State which
has, under its constitution, power to regulate the
business of selling gasoline (and doubtless, also,
the power to tax the privilege of carrying on that
business) is not prevented by the due process
clause from imposing the incidental burden.''
The federal courts have not been alone in deciding
that the failure to provide for reimbursement to a
private party for collecting and remitting a tax is not
5
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violative of due process. See Tamrner v. State, 190 So.
292 (Ala. 1939); Woodrich v. St. Catherine Gravel Co.,
195 So. 307 (Miss. 1940). The Colorado Supreme Court
felt of a similar view in Porter v. Armstrong, 132 P. 2d
788 (Colo.). The Court there held that requirement that
an attorney collect a professional service tax imposed
on his clients and remit the same to the state did not
violate the state or federal due process clauses.
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court
are binding on the issue the federal due process clause,
and since our own state provision on due process, Article
I, Section 7, was patterned after the federal provision,
decisions of the United States Supreme Court are highly
persuasive as to the application of that clause of our
state Constitution. Untermyer v. State Taa; Commission,
102 Utah 214, 129 P. 2d 881. It would appear, therefore,
in the absence of some compelling reason to the contrary,
that Article I, Section 7 should not be deemed to prevent
the Legislature from establishing the requirements it
has in Chapter 111, Laws of Utah 1959. Appellant in
his brief contends that the complexities of accountings
to state and federal government makes necessary the
expense of employing special persons. He contends that
the Supreme Court of the United States has indicated
that if the burden becomes confiscatory it would be
violative of due process. However, appellant makes the
mistake of combining the ~eparate actions of two distinct
sovereigns, the federal and the state, to claim his burden.
The only issue before this Court as to due process is
whether the burden imposed by the State of Utah is so
6
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confiscatory. It should be remembered that 1959 was
the first year in which this power was used. Therefore,
the state's actions at present are no more burdensome
than those originally considered legal by the federal and
state courts.
Appellant also claims that the burden of remitting
and collecting taxes without compensation imposes an
involuntary servitude. The Thirteenth Amendment to
the Federal Constitution, and Section 22, Article I of
our State Constitution, prohibit the imposition of slavery
or involuntary servitude. These provisions are usually
deemed personal, 48 C.J.S. 766; Slaughter House Cases,
16 Wall 36, and, therefore, it is questionable whether
appellant, a municipal corporation, drawing its very
life from the state, may complain of such actions or
even avail itself of these constitutional provisions. Even
assuming that appellant can claim these rights, the overwhelming weight of authority is to the effect that in this
instance the claim is without merit.
In State ex rel. Arn v. Tax Commission, 163 Kan.
240, 181 P. 2d 532 (1947), the Kansas Supreme Court
held a requirement imposed upon sellers of gasoline to
collect a sales tax from their purchasers, which was
imposed on the purchasers, and remit it to the state did
not constitute an involuntary servitude. There the
Kansas Court said :
''It is alleged Chapter 271 requires vendors
of motor fuels to collect and to make the tax
without compensation, and in doing so subjects
7
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them to involuntary servitude, in violation of section 6 of our Bill of Rights. This section of our
Bill of Rights is tantamount to the 13th amendment of our Federal constitution. Respecting that
it was said, in Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332,
36 S. Ct. 258, 259 60 L. Ed. 672: 'This .Amendment was adopted with reference to conditions
existing since the foundation of our government,
and the term "involuntary servitude" was intended to cover those forms of compulsory labor akin
to African slavery which, in practical operation,
would tend to produce like undesirable results. It
introduced no novel doctrine with respect of
services always treated as exceptional, and certainly was not intended to interdict enforcement
of those duties which individuals owe to the state,
such as services in the army, militia, on the jury,
etc. The great purpose in view was liberty under
the protection of effective government, not the
destruction of the latter by depriving it of essential powers.' (Citing cases.)
"It is generally recognized that an individual
may be required to give services to a state without compensation, Crews v. Lundquist, 361 TIL
193, 197 N.E. 768. Indeed, it is a common practice, both for the Federal government and for the
state to call upon citizens to perform some service for the state without compensation.''
In Porter v. Armstrong, supra, the Court also re~
jected the issue of involuntary servitude. See also Johnson v. Dictendorf, 56 Idaho 620, 57 P. 2d 1068; Morrow v.
Henneford, 182 Wash. 625, 47 P. 2d 1016; Ranier National Park Co. v. Martin, 18 Fed. Supp. 60.
This Court may take judicial notice of the history
underlying the passage of involuntary servitude amend8
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ments. It is undisputed that they principally arose to
abolish slavery and to give constitutional effect to the
emancipation proclamation.
Recent cases have also affirmed against the argument appellant now contends for. In Abney v. Campbell, 206 F. 2d 836, the issue was the uncompensated collection and remission of F.I.C.A. taxes. The Court, In
rejecting the involuntary servitude issue, stated:
''The enforcement of the act is not the imposition of a servitude. It is the collection of a tax
and the enforcement of an obligation which under
settled Federal law appellants may be and are
lawfully subjected to * * *. It cannot be a violation of the 13th Amendment.''
And in Porth v. Brodrick, 214 F. 2d 925 (1954) as
to self employment taxes :
''Any servitude resulting from requirements
of tax laws would not be the kind of involuntary
servitude referred to in the Constitution.''
Most recently the almost identical issue raised by
the appellant here was before the Indiana Court, and
rejected. Akers v. Handley, 149 N.E. 2d 692 (Ind. 1958).
It is submitted that the requirements imposed upon
appellant by Chapter 111, Laws of Utah 1959, are
neither unusual nor severe. To allow the proposition
the appellant contends for would require every action
that a citizen may be required to do by a state to be
compensated. The police powers, and those other powers
9
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incidental to the proper functioning of government
would be subjugated to other provisions of the Constitution which cannot be so construed, nor were so intended
by their framers.

POINT II.
CHAPTER 111 OF THE LAWS OF UTAH 1959 DOES
NOT VIOLATE SECTION 22, ARTICLE VI, OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH.
Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution of Utah
provides in part :
''The vote upon the final passage of all bills
shall be by yeas and nays ; and no law shall be
revised or amended by reference to its title only;
but the act as revised or section as amended, shall
be re-enacted and published at length.''
The purpose of this constitutional provision was to
make certain that the members of the Legislature had
before them more than the mere title of a proposed
amendment, but that they have before them the substance
of the bill so that they may see in general what it purports to do. As was said in State v. Beddo,. 22 Utah 432,
63 Pac. 96:
''This is a wise provision of the Constitution,
and was intended to avoid that confusion which
would inevitably follow, if an act or section could
be revised or amended by mere reference to the
title, or section, or word or line."
Thus the purpose of such a provision when read in
context with the other restrictions placed upon the

10
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Legislature's procedures becomes clear. It is obvious
that it was intended to make certain that the Legislature
had some substantive knowledge of its action.
However, the legislation must be clearly amendatory
and not additive, before constitutional provisions like
ours become effective. Thus where an act is merely
claimed to be amendatory and is not amendatory in
form, the courts have generally classified the legislation
as not being amendatory. Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd Ed., Sec. 1917. In Blakemore v. Dolan, 50
Ind. 194, the Court stated:
''An act is independent when it embraces
matter not previously legislated upon; or it may
be independent where there is a law upon the
subject, when the act does not attempt to amend
such law, but makes a new enactment."
This same doctrine has been adopted by the Utah
Supreme Court. In State ex rel. Cluff v. Weber County
Irr. Dist., 62 Utah 209, 218 Pac. 732 (1923), the following language was used to express the principle:
"True, it may be that some of the provisions
of Chapter 68 may in practice be found to affect
or modify other provisions relating to irrigation
or water rights. That, however, is not what the
Constitution forbids. Later laws are frequently
enacted which in some way modify or affect
earlier laws relating to the same subject matter.
That such is the effect of later enactments is
inevitable, and in no way contravenes the constitutional provision that laws shall be amended only
in a particular way. That provision has reference
11
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only to direct amendments, and not to conflicting
provisions of separate and independent acts.''
In the instant case it is clear that Chapter 111, Laws
of Utah 1959 was in reality not an amendatory act, but
an act adding to the body of Utah law dealing with withholding taxes. An examination of the status of the law
shows that in 1957 there was an act providing for withholding from non-resident employees. ·.Chapter 124, Laws
of Utah 1957. Chapter 111, Laws of Utah 1959 did not
change the provisions of the 1957 law except to add to
its coverage provisions for resident employees who were
not covered under the original act. The changes that
resulted to non-resident employees were as a result of
making the law uniform as to all employees. Any changes
affecting the 1957 act were set out in length, but even
so Chapter 111 was not amendatory but additive, and
only incidentally affected the situation as it applied to
non-residents. Therefore, it is submitted that under the
doctrine set out by the Court in the case of State ex rel.
Cluff v. Weber County Irr. Dist., supra, considering tha-t
Chapter 111, Laws of Utah 1959 only incidentally affects
non-resident employees, either under the 1957 law or in
relation to Chapter 112, Laws of Utah 1959, and that it
did not amend but added to the law at that time, Article
VI, Section 22 has not been violated.
Appellant contends in his brief that since Chapter
112, Laws of Utah 1959 was signed by the Governor,
before the provisions of Chapter 111, that the failure
of Chapter 111 to include provisions of Chapter 112
violated the constitutional requirement of amendment
12
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at length. Although it has already been concluded that
Chapter 111 was not amendatory, it is submitted that
an additional reason exists why the failure of Chapter
111 to include the provisions of Chapter 112 is not violative of Article VI, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution.
Article VI, Section 25 of the Utah Constitution provides:
''All acts shall be officially published, and
no act shall take effect until so published, nor
until sixty days after the adjournment of the
session. at which it passed, unless the Legislature
by a vote of two-thirds of all the members elected
to each house, shall otherwise direct.''
Both Chapters 111 and 112 of the Laws of Utah
1959 came into effect at the same time, that is, on 12
May 1960. Therefore, it is submitted that since Chapter
112 did not become effective until the same day as did
Chapter 111, there could be no requirement that Chapter
111 have included within its terms any of the matter
contained in Chapter 112. Especially is this so since
House Bill93 which became Chapter 111 had been passed
by one of the houses before Senate Bill 58, which became
Chapter 112, had been signed by the Governor. If it is
contended that acts submitted in the same session which
cover related subjects must include each other, the confusion would be manifest. If one bill were vetoed or not
passed the other bill containing the same matter would
also of necessity have to be dealt with in the same manner.
The only thing which would correct such a situation
would be an item veto which the Governor of this state
does not possess. In addition, such a construction of
13
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Article VI, Section 22, would do violence to the very
meaning of Article VI, Section 25, and certainly it is
hornbook law that constitutional provisions should be
construed as far as possible to make them harmonious
and compatible. As was said in Shook v. Larufer, 100
S.W. 1042 (Tex. 1907) where it was contended an act
of the Legislature should be given effect prior to the
time set out in the constitutional provision :
"We also are of the opinion, * * * that if it
was the intention of the legislature to make the
provision under consideration refer to the date
of the passage of the act, it would be an attempt
to make the law partially operative sooner than
permitted by the state Constitution, and would
bring it in conflict with the provision of that
instrument which prohibits acts passed in the
manner this was from taking effect earlier than
ninety days after adjournment of the session of
the legislature.''
The Utah Supreme Court has itself indicated a
position similar to that we now advocate. In Ha;nsen v.
Morris, 3 U. 2d 310, 283 P. 2d 884 (1955), in response to
a claim that one law repealed another, where they become effective the same day, the Court said:
"The contention that (3) the limitations statute, Chapter 19, Laws of Utah 1951, was repealed
by Chapter 58, same laws, seems without merit.
Both were passed the same day and became effective on the same day.''
Certainly if two laws which become effective the
same day cannot be said to repeal each other, so laws
14
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which become effective the same day cannot be said to
amend each other, especially where there is no basic
conflict between the two, and where they are compatible
in dealing with different areas of the same general
subject.
If the proposition as contended for by the appellant was adopted, no end of confusion and difficulty
would result. If a bill on a general subject was passed
by one house of the legislature, and another bill passed,
also of the same general subject, by the other house, but
with neither bill specifically in conflict with the other,
as here, then each bill would have to encompass the
other before it was finally passed by either house or
face the objection of amendment without setting forth
at length. Each house of the legislature would be the
executive secretary of the other.

It is submitted, therefore, that Chapter 111 of the
Laws of Utah does not violate Article VI, Section 22 of
the Utah Constitution.

POINT III.
CHAPTER 111 OF THE LAWS OF UTAH 1959 IS NOT
INVALID FOR ANY IMPERFECTIONS APPEARING
IN THE TITLE THEREOF.
Appellant contends that Chapter 111 of the Laws
of Utah 1959 is unconstitutional because the subject
matter of the act is not clearly expressed in the title
and that the body and title are in irreconcilable conflict.
15
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The title of Chapter 111, Laws of Utah 1959 states its
general purpose as follows:
''An Act Amending Section 59-14-65 Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as Amended by Chapter
124, Laws of Utah 1957, Section 59-14-71 Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as Amended by Chapter
124, Laws of Utah 1957 and Section 59-14-71.1,
as Enacted by Chapter 124, Laws of Utah 1957,
Providing for the Deduction and Withholding of
Individual Income Tax from Wages Paid by Employers to Resident Employees; and Providing
for the Reimbursement of Expenses in Inaugurating and Administering the Withholding Provisions of This Act.''
In construing the provisions of Section 23, Article
VI of the Utah Constitution, which requires that the
subject matter be clearly expressed in its title, the Utah
Supreme Court has stated:
"That the provision should be applied so as
not to hamper the lawmaking power in framing
and adopting comprehensive measures covering
the whole subject * * *."

Elder v. Edwards, 34 Utah 13, 95 Pac. 367.
Other general rules of law are recognized as axioms
by which courts should measure bills as against the constitutional requirements. A statute should not be declared unconstitutional simply because the court feels a
better expression of the title could have been made.
State v. Driscoll, 101 Mont. 348, 54 P. 2d 571 (1936). The
act should be presumed constitutional until conclusively
demonstrated to the contrary. Tonopah db G. R. Co. r.
16
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N evada-Californria Transp. Co., 58 Nev. 234, 75 P. 2d 727
(1938). The rule of law is well expressed in Sutherland,
Statutory Construction, Vol. 1, 3rd Ed., Section 1704,
where it is said:
''The constitutional provision on titles is construed liberally to sustain the validity of the title
and the statute. Narrow or technical constructions
are avoided and the statute will be read fairly
and reasonably in order not to thwart reasonable
legislative activity. Two purposes must be
served : (1) Legislation must be kept free of
abuses against which the provision is directed;
and (2) legitimate enactments are not to be invalidated by over-nice distinctions.
The courts will not ascribe an intention to
the legislature that will place an act in conflict
with the Constitution. Hypercriticism will not be
indulged. If the various provisions of a statute
fairly may be regarded (J)S in furtherance of the
gen,era.l object expressed in the title, the statute
should be upheld."
And as said in In Re Hadley, 336 Pa. 100, 6 A. 2d 87 4
(1939):
"Unless a substantive matter entirely disconnected with the named legislation is included
within a bill, the act does not fall within the constitutional inhibitions.''
A fair examination of the act in question shows that
the title very clearly expresses the general subject under
legislation; that of withholding taxes. It is contended
by the appellant that the choice of the word ''reimbursement" is so glaring in inconsistency that it totally de17
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feat the bill. It should be noted that nowhere in the
title is there any indication of an intent to make provision to reimburse employers, nor is there such a provision contained in the body of the act. There is, however, a provision in the body of the act to compensate
the two state agencies who bear the immense burden of
the statute, the Finance and Tax Commissions. The
word ''reimbursement'' should not be singled out from
the phrase, and stress placed thereon to make it appear
inappropriate. It should be read in context referring to
the words "Inaugurating" and "Administering". It is
obvious that the Tax Commission and the Finance Commission must inaugurate and administer the act; therefore, when the body of the act provides the monies for
such undertaking, there is obviously no inconsistency
between body and title. It would be hypercriticism to
say that the confusion here, if any, is so great as to be
''entirely disconnected with the subject matter.''
In addition, it should be noted that the act took
effect on 12 May 1959, but that it applied to the taxable
year from 1 January 1959. 59-14-71.1, U.C.A. 1953, as
amended. It is a matter of common knowledge that the
Tax Commission and Finance Commission are given
general budgetary appropriations for the administration
of their offices, etc. Undoubtedly the necessity was
raised upon the passage of the act, of making various
changes and additions within these commissions. These
would diminish the normal appropriation without additional funds; therefore, it would be necessary to "reimburse" the general fund by making an appropriation
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for that purpose. This being what was done, it cannot
be claimed the body and title of the act are in irreconcilable conflict. Possibly more definitive terms could have
been used, but it is not for the courts to substitute their
expressions in cool retrospect for those of the legislature.
If the latter's expression is reasonably determined to
apprise the legislator of the bill he is voting on, and not
wholly unrelated to the body of it, it should not be
struck down because more descriptive language could
be found.
Appellant further contends that Chapter 111, Laws
of Utah 1959, is violative of Article VI, Section 23
because it refers to "Resident Employees", whereas the
act is susceptible to interpretation to cover all employees.
It should be noted that under Section 2(b) of Chapter
111, Laws of Utah, that employee is not defined with
any special language directed towards non-resident employees. If non-resident employees are included, it is
because of the breadth of the language used. However,
the language is easily as susceptible to defining '' resident'' employees irrespective of their location or capacity. It should be noted also that the title appraises the
reader of what new addition is being made to the law.
The 1957 law required withholding from non-residents ;
Chapter 111 merely added to the present law so as to
include residents in addition to non-residents. There is
no inconsistency between the title and the body. The
title says the bill applies withholding tax provisions to
resident employees and the body of the act so provides.
It should be remembered that part of the contention of
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the appellant is that the title does not clearly express
the subject of the body. This is obviously erroneous
since the title does express the contents of the body. The
general subject under legislation was withholding taxes,
and this is clearly expressed in the title.
The fact that it is possible to construe the act as
including non-resident employees as well as resident
employees does not invalidate the act on the ground that
no mention of non-resident employees is made in the
title. A title need not set out every possible construction
or proviso of the body. Detroit v. Detroit Citizens St.
Ry. Co., 184 U. S. 368; Sutherland, supra, Sec. 1716. As
is said in Sutherland, op. cit. :
"A title is not defective because it fails to set
forth the details of an enactment. Numerous provisions may be included under a brief, general
title, and the title need not, indeed, for purpose
of readability, should not be made an index to or
an abstract of the contents of a statute. Particulars are to be found in the act not in the caption."
It is clear that the act in question deals with only
one subject, withholding taxes. It clearly expresses in
the title the subjects covered in the body. The additions
to the law then in force are made clear. The fact that
some interpretation not expressed in direct language in
the body of the act is conceivable that will cover an additional class (not an additional subject) not expressed in
the title is not contrary to the Utah Constitution. In Re
Monk, 16 Utah 100, 50 Pac. 810; 1J1arlineau v. Crabbs, 46
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Utah 327, 150 Pac. 301; State v. Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 94
P. 2d 414.
In the field of taxation the Utah Supreme Court
has held titles that were less generous than the one under
consideration not to violate Article VI, Section 23, Elder
u. Edwards, 34 Utah 13, 95 Pac. 367; State Tax Commission v. City of Logan., 88 Utah 406, 54 P. 2d 1197.
Thus in the case of Salt La:ke Union Stock Yards v. State
Tax Commission,, 93 Utah 166, 71 P. 2d 538, the court
held an amendment to the Sales Tax Act then in force,
not contrary to Article VI, Section 23 because certain
dispensations of collected revenue were made to the
school district funds. It must be concluded that the body
of Chapter 111, Laws of Utah is sufficiently related to
the title so as to avoid any constitutional objection.
The Utah Legislature meets but for sixty days every
two years. During that time they must consider a vast
amount of problems and consider volumes of bills.
Although they must be held to the mandate of the Constitution, the latter should not be so construed as to make
valid and important legislation void because in critical
examination one could have better expressed their intent.

POINT IV.
CHAPTER 111 OF THE LAWS OF UTAH 1959 IS A
CONSTITUTIONAL ENACTMENT BINDING UPON
THE APPELLANT, AND ALL OTHERS WHOM IT
PURPORTS TO AFFECT.
21
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

From the above it follows that Chapter 111, Laws
of Utah 1959 is a constitutional legislative proviso
binding upon the plaintiff, and the lower Court correctly
granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendant
against plaintiff.

CONCLUSION
Based on the above arguments of law and facts it
appears manifest that no constitutional provision either
procedural or substantive was violated by the passage
of Chapter 111, Laws of Utah 1959. This being so,
appellant must comply with the provisions thereof to
the degree they effect it.

WALTER L. BUDGE

Attorney General
RONALD N. BOYCE

Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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